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What Plato Dramatized
Episodi & Post
Episodi
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13 FEB 2026 · Socrates develops his sophistic argument that what is neither one extreme nor its opposite may contain one of the extremes without acquiring the characteristic of that extreme, or indeed may acquire that characteristic. The boys accept everything he says, despite his best efforts to confuse them.
6 FEB 2026 · A lesson in sophistry. We also learn that Menexenus had brown hair.
30 GEN 2026 · Socrates argues sophistically for the position that what is neither good nor bad is dear to, or conversely a friend of (slipping between philon with dative and genitive), the good. He uses as his example a body, per se neither good nor bad, which with health has no need of a physician, but with disease is required to welcome and be dear to the physician. Socrates tries several formulations designed to wake the boys up from their mental slumber, but without success. It would seem that Socrates is more concerned with making the boys think critically than with providing a serious argument. Sophistry and a terrible argument have more chance of arousing critical thinking - arguably!
23 GEN 2026 · Socrates reminds Menexenus that the previous argument has led them to conclude that the friendly is not of like to like or of opposite to opposite, and he proposes that it is neither of like or of opposite. He needs to resort to a particular characteristic to exemplify what he means, and he chooses the good, a characteristic which has already been used in the argument. They settle on the friendly being of the neither-good-nor- bad to the good. Menexenus is clearly unable to remember that it had been agreed with Lysis that the good requires no friend since it is self-sufficient (this had led to the conclusion that the good is not the friend of the good, and hence that the friendly is not of like to like).
16 GEN 2026 · With Lysis, Socrates concluded that the friend is not of like to like. With Menexenus, Socrates has concluded that the friend is not of opposite to opposite. It would seem reasonable, then, to suggest that the friend is the good to the neither good nor bad. It is actually not all that reasonable.
9 GEN 2026 · Having argued with Lysis that the friendly is not friendly to its like, and with Menexenus that the friendly is not friendly to its opposite, Socrates proposes (still with Menexenus) what might seem to be an uneristic and therefore more plausible solution, that the friendly is friendly to something between the two extremes.
2 GEN 2026 · Socrates continues to develop a highly provocative position he claims to have heard from someone clever, that the most opposite is most friendly to the most opposite, apparently contradicting the earlier claim that like is friendly to like. Menexenus takes over the conversation from Lysis, and Socrates returns to eristics.
26 DIC 2025 · Socrates provides only an argument from authority for his outrageous claim not only that the same are hostile to the same, but that most hostile are good people to good people. Even the argument from authority is problematic since Socrates deliberately misquotes two of the most famous lines of the poet Hesiod. We might almost suspect that he is looking for a reaction from his interlocutors.
19 DIC 2025 · Socrates continues to try to make Lysis think dialectically, but fails miserably. Lysis accepts that the same is useless and not a friend to the same, although the good person is a friend to the good person (this is a contradicton), Once again, it is Socrates himself who has to discover that they have been seriously misled (they have, by him), and he adduces someone who is said to have claimed that the same thing to the same thing, and the good people to the good people, are actually hostile. Socrates claims that that man used to adduce Hesiod, but the famous quote from him will have to wait until the next episode.
12 DIC 2025 · Socrates leads Lysis by the nose, and Lysis does not object. Socrates "interprets" the poet and the physikoi as claiming that only the similar to the simlar are friends, but if those who are dissimilar in themselves are bad, this means that only the good are friends. Since this doesn't cause Lysis to object, Socrates adds another problem, that the similar add nothing useful to the similar; if another adds nothing useful to oneself, why would one love such a person? The verb phileo (I love) is replaced by agapao (I am affectionate). Agape in modern Greek is the word for love. Philia is now reserved for friendship.
What Plato Dramatized
Informazioni
| Autore | Ivor Ludlam |
| Organizzazione | Ivor Ludlam |
| Categorie | Filosofia |
| Sito | - |
| platoparadigm@icloud.com |
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