26 OTT 2026 · No, you don’t want to put up Halloween decorations this afternoon, you want to continue to avoid it until the last minute…and instead listen to the Midrats Podcast!
Summary
Sal and Mark use the Battle of Leyte Gulf as a springboard to discuss modern naval power, industrial capacity, and what it takes to sustain a fleet in a long war. They connect World War II lessons to current questions about Taiwan, WESTPAC operations, auxiliary ships, and the need to harden U.S. military infrastructure against disruption. Leyte Gulf is an example of why depth, logistics, repair capacity, and industrial preparation matter more than a single battle narrative. They also break down current debates about Taiwan deterrence, maritime supply chains, unmanned systems, and the vulnerability of U.S. bases and support ships.
Show Links
- Sal Mercogliano’s, https://www.youtube.com/@wgowshipping podcast: https://youtu.be/vitMtjpZxlw?si=MUFtNkuolCee6ASI?
- Strategic Ambiguity Isn’t Perfect, but It Remains Washington’s Best Bet, by Brent Sadler and Allen Zheng at Heritage, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/strategic-ambiguity-isnt-perfect-it-remains-washingtons-best-bet
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Security_Multi-Mission_Vessel (AKA Empire State Class)
- https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/01/general-dynamics-unveils-adx-vls-reloading-destroyer-tender/.
- https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/in-a-first-australias-ghost-shark-submarine-turns-into-aerial-drone-launchpad/ar-AA2fOoMo?ocid=BingNewsSerp
- https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/10/20/marine-corps-creates-first-medium-missile-battalion/
Key topics
- In this episode: why the Battle of Leyte Gulf is still a masterclass in maritime power, industrial depth, and strategic endurance
- The role of repair ships, floating dry docks, tenders, and mobile bases in keeping the fleet in the fight
- How U.S. shipbuilding and industrial mobilization before 1941 shaped the outcome of the Pacific war
- Why mass, attrition, and replacement capacity mattered at Leyte Gulf - and still matter in a future Pacific war
- Brent Sadler’s response to arguments for abandoning Taiwan, and why strategic ambiguity remains central
- The risk of signaling allies that the U.S. would not defend Taiwan, and the broader consequences for Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Europe
- Taiwan’s role in global shipping lanes and semiconductor supply chains, including the claim that a disruption could cut the U.S. economy by trillions
- Shortfalls in current U.S. maritime support forces - including tenders, dry docks, hospital ships, aviation support ships, and mariner manpower
- Proposals to adapt the National Security Multi-Mission Vessel line into auxiliary variants for tenders, hospital ships, and support roles
- The case for arming auxiliaries and merchant ships for self-defense.
- Unmanned and autonomous systems in the maritime fight - from “Loyal Escort” concepts to ghost-shark style undersea launch platforms
- The Fortress initiative to prepare military bases to operate for 90 days without outside support, and why hardened infrastructure is now overdue
Timestamps
00:00 - Live show setup, chat room callout, and the Halloween melee format
02:11 - Why Leyte Gulf remains a touchstone for maritime power
03:07 - Sal Mergogliano’s Leyte Gulf analysis and the importance of depth
06:53 - Reindustrialization and why fleets require industrial capacity
08:17 - Leyte Gulf numbers and the meaning of mass in naval warfare
10:40 - Why U.S. planning must account for a long war, not a quick one
11:39 - Brett Sadler’s response to Taiwan abandonment arguments
14:50 - Why abandoning Taiwan would reshape the Indo-Pacific balance
15:54 - Taiwan semiconductors and the economic cost of losing access
19:33 - Taiwan, sea lanes, and why geography makes the island strategically decisive
20:31 - Support shortfalls: tenders, dry docks, hospital ships, and aviation support
21:00 - Using the National Security Multi-Mission Vessel line for support variants
25:20 - Empire State-class numbers, capacity, and why the production line should stay open
27:26 - The old fleet train, service squadrons, and what moved to MSC
29:19 - Why auxiliaries and support ships need defenses against autonomous threats
31:38 - Neosho, Coral Sea, and the moral case for arming ships that go into harm’s way
34:24 - Escort concepts: unmanned systems, aircraft, helicopters, and convoy protection
37:13 - How to pressure China: mines, undersea operations, and unexpected reaches
38:41 - Australia’s Ghost Shark and the utility of large unmanned underwater vehicles
41:28 - Unmanned systems as additions, not just alternatives, to manned platforms
43:13 - Why fleet experimentation with autonomous systems matters
45:15 - The Empire State-class auxiliary idea and bolt-on self-defense options
47:22 - Loyal Escort vessels, containerized control systems, and lower-cost maritime defense
48:46 - Using current production to support remote Marine units and logistics
51:04 - The Fortress initiative and 90-day base resilience requirements
53:24 - Conventional missile threats, soft-kill infrastructure attacks, and why base hardening matters
57:54 - What Fort Bragg, Fort Hood, Fort Knox, and other bases need to consider
61:01 - The Ian Brinksman classified leak issue
66:11 - Closing thanks to live chat participants and farewell