Though Hegel's 1820 Philosophy of Right faced undue criticism during and after his life, being labeled an apology for Prussian absolutism, it was in fact an effort by Hegel to express the rational form of a reformed, modern European state and society. This vision was shared by individuals such as Baron von Stein and Prince von Hardenburg in Prussia, and was well-understood by Hegel's friends and students.

At the heart of Hegel's work is the notion that what constitutes right is essential for the realization of freedom. In this aspect, he stayed true to his Kantian roots while simultaneously breaking away from Kant. A key difference between the two philosophers lies in Hegel's rejection of Kant's assertion that freedom necessitates exercising a non-natural causality upon ourselves, one that exists outside the natural order and can initiate events without being affected by prior causal chains.

Hegel, on the other hand, saw freedom not as a form of causality, but rather as our ability to adopt a negative stance towards our inclinations, desires, and impulses. While both philosophers agreed that the will is fundamentally a form of practical reason guided by norms, Hegel disputed the notion that a special form of causality was required for such a will to be free.

According to Hegel, our freedom lies in our approach to our actions; we are truly free when we act based on reasons we can consider our own – those with which we identify ourselves. An individual's preferences, desires, and impulses hold normative status only if they align with their overall life plan and contribute to their sense of identity.

Hegel believed that while there may be an empirical explanation for how our decisions ultimately move us, this would not be crucial for understanding why an action is considered one's own or expresses one's acknowledgment of their reasons for acting. The need for a special doctrine of transcendental causality would only arise if reasons were viewed as separate entities.

In the realm of human nature, the ability to possess a will signifies, foremost, the capacity for one's actions to embody one's practical commitments - emerging from and integrating within the grand design of one's existence. Such actions are executed not due to extraneous reasons, but precisely because of these commitments.

Secondly, it entails the aptitude for introspection regarding these practical engagements, evaluating their relevance in relation to other objectives and principles an individual may contemplate. Lastly, it requires the comprehension that these obligations are self-imposed and not dictated by external forces.
To possess a will is to exhibit intentionality in our actions and adhere to established norms.

As Hegel discerned, the will is a manifestation of thought. Conversely, the absence of such liberty would entail acting based on factors one cannot rationally support or validate - ultimately succumbing to external influences such as unbridled desires or arbitrary societal customs.