FEDERALIST 10 (AUTHORED BY MADISON WRITING AS PUBLIUS) CLAIMS THAT THE “VIOLENCE OF FACTION” IS THE “MORTAL DISEASE” OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS. EVEN TODAY, HE SAYS, POINTING TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATES, THE DIVISIONS BETWEEN RIVAL PARTIES TOO OFTEN LEAD NOT TO REASONABLE COMPROMISES BUT TO DECISIONS MADE “NOT ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF JUSTICE, AND THE RIGHTS OF THE MINOR PARTY, BUT BY THE SUPERIOR FORCE OF AN INTERESTED AND OVERBEARING MAJORITY.” UNLESS IT REMEDIES THIS PROBLEM ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, THE NEW CONSTITUTION WILL NOT CEMENT “A WELL CONSTRUCTED UNION” OF THE STATES.
WE CAN CURE THE DISEASE OF FACTION EITHER BY “REMOVING ITS CAUSES” OR BY “CONTROLLING ITS EFFECTS.” THERE ARE BUT TWO WAYS TO REMOVE THE CAUSES OF FACTION: TO DESTROY “THE LIBERTY ESSENTIAL TO ITS EXISTENCE,” OR TO GIVE “TO EVERY CITIZEN THE SAME OPINIONS, THE SAME PASSIONS, AND THE SAME INTERESTS.” SINCE, IN OTHER WORDS, THE CAUSES OF FACTION ARE “SOWN IN THE NATURE OF MAN,” WE MUST DESIGN POPULAR GOVERNMENT TO CONTROL ITS EFFECTS.
FORTUNATELY, PUBLIUS POINTS OUT, AMONG THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR POPULAR GOVERNMENT — A PURE DEMOCRACY, A SMALL REPUBLIC, OR A LARGE REPUBLIC — THE CONSTITUTION IS DESIGNED NOT ONLY FOR THE ACTUAL AMERICAN SITUATION BUT ALSO FOR THAT MOST LIKELY TO MITIGATE THE PROBLEM OF FACTION. IT IS DESIGNED FOR A LARGE REPUBLIC EXTENDING OVER A GEOGRAPHICALLY LARGE AND DIVERSE TERRITORY AND COMPREHENDING WITHIN ITS LIMITS A DIVERSE AND CONSTANTLY SHIFTING AND RECONFIGURING ARRAY OF INTEREST GROUPS. THIS VERY DIVERSITY WILL PREVENT ANY SINGLE FACTION FROM ACQUIRING THE POWER TO TYRANNIZE OVER THE OTHERS.